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Powerful revisionist currents now flow through the disciplines of social 
science with regard to the relationship between politics and society. Emerging out 
of a variety of intellectual traditions -- Althusserian, Gramscian, Saussurian, as 
well as more conventional Weberian approaches -- the revisionism by no means 
makes up a unified stream. But it is interesting that in spite of their disparate 
origins, each current represents itself in the form of a restoration; the "new 
institutionalism," the new project to "bring the state back in," the new history and 
sociology of the law, and, most prominently, the recent "linguistic turn" 
emphasizing discursive, textual, or "cultural" artifacts, all claim to be restoring 
"politics"1 to its proper explanatory role in the analysis of human  affair^.^ A 
substantial consensus has now crystallized across disciplinary boundaries, which 
views these revisionist currents as part and parcel of a paradigmatic shift in 
academic discourse itself. "Culture," language, institutions, the state -- that is, 
the primary elements of the political side of human existence -- have been elevated 
to the central position in revisionist explanatory models significantly undermining 
the authority of "the social" or "society" as the privileged, objective ground of 
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social scientific explanation. And this "dissolution of the socialu3 presages, it is 
thought, nothing less than the dissolution of the dominant modes of interpretation, 
both liberal and marxist, which have informed social analysis for most of this 
century and much of the last. 
This older tradition of social analysis had itself emerged as a paradigmatic 
revision of sorts. I t  developed in opposition to an original historiography which 
measured historical significance strictly in terms of formal political change effected 
through the intentional acts of elite historical figures. When we consider that this 
original historiography narrated institutional histories, histories of sovereign 
states, legal histories, and intellectual histories, then the new revisionism appears 
very much like a restoration. The question which arises, of course, is whether the 
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long diversion through a tradition predicated on social rather than political 
determination made any difference. Has social science experienced something akin 
to an Hegelian revolution, generating synthetic insights from both the political- 
institutional approach and the sociological approaches? Or have we simply come 
full circle, returning to the point of departure after a long and fruitless detour 
away from "the political"? Few, if any, of the participants in these new revisionist 
currents would claim to be merely reinstating a history of the high politics of a 
narrow spectrum of elites. But over the past decade, the call to repoliticize social 
science has moved from a position fully sympathetic to the contributions made 
within the sociological framework to a position actively dismissive of the 
sociological framework itself. Within the historical profession, for example, the 
revisionist problematic has shifted from "why does social history ignore politics?" 
to "why should political historians have to look a t  society?"4 And the answer to 
the latter seems increasingly to be that they need not. 
We propose to examine the claims of the new revisionism in the context of 
the historiography of popular politics in 19th century England. I t  is useful to 
begin here, because the three-stage process of revision occurred in this context 
over a remarkably short span of less than 30 years. This temporal compression 
(made possible because the Anglo-American history profession remained for so long 
impregnable to more sociological approaches already holding sway over other 
academic disciplines) has brought the debates into impressive conceptual focus. In 
part this is because the competing paradigms are often both defended and 
criticized most persuasively by one and the same person who has changed position 
over the course of a career. 
Gareth Stedman Jones presents an exemplary case in point. His early work 
was formulated quite self-consciously from the point of view of a social historian, 
while his more recent work has made up one of the most forceful and influential 
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statements of the new re~isionism.~ "Rethinking Chartism," published in 1983 in 
the significantly titled collection of essays, m e s  of Cl- announced 
Stedman Jones' shift away from a sociological methodology which viewed class as 
an ontological reality in favor of a methodological linguistics which viewed class as 
a discursive construction. The ambition of the article was to move discussions of 
Chartism away from questions relating to the social location of its support in order 
to bring the "politics" of Chartism "to the fore." His method aimed a t  freeing 
Chartism of "the a priori assumptions of historians about its social meaning" 
! 
through the application of a "non-referential conception of language to the study of 
Chartist speeches and writings."6 
. . . . . Stedman Jones' argument, however, is more ambitious than simply 
I ' .  redressing an imbalance; the thrust of his analysis of the political language of 
- .  Chartism calls into question the relevance of its social context altogether. 
We cannot therefore decode political language to reach a primal and 
, - material expression of interest since i t  is the discursive structure of 
political language which conceives and defines interest in the first 
, . place. What we must therefore do is to study the production of 
interest, identification grievance and aspiration within political 
languages themselves. 7 
And here the radical nature of his argument becomes apparent. Stedman Jones' 
contention of the political determination ("prefiguring") of interest and identity 
seriously erodes the importance of "social context" to political analysis. His 
contentions, in other words, have quite subversively called into question the very 
social historical project upon which his early work was premised. 
This article seeks to interrogate the claim that the new discursive-political 
history has made a progressive break with an older "new social history." 
Specifically, we attempt to investigate the claim made by Stedman Jones and 
others that the explanatory power of politics has been rescued from the reductions 
of the "new social history" by way of a critical reading of his own work within 
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each paradigm. While sympathetic with its commitment to political analysis, we 
feel that the revisionist project itself betrays reductionist tendencies as subversive 
of the integrity of the political as that of the social historical methodology it  seeks 
to transcend. Through comparing the two projects, re-tracing the critical path 
through which the new revisionism has reached its present position, we hope to 
suggest both where the new revisionism went wrong and how it might be righted. 
The "new social history" informing the early work of Stedman Jones first 
won academic acceptance in the mid-1960s. Inspired by the liberationist struggles 
which transformed political culture in Britain and America in the period between 
the British Labour Party's election in 1945 and Richard Nixon's resignation in 
1974 -- the Labour Party's post-war success in Britain, the civil rights movement 
in the United States, colonial nationalisms, the anti-war and student movements, 
the feminist movement -- an increasingly numerous and influential body of 
historians struggled to theorize political practice in ways that encompassed mass 
movements, ways that could allow for an actively participatory vision of politics. 
Historiographical attention shifted accordingly, not just in favor of what were 
perceived to be the past equivalents of contemporary radicalisms (e.g., Levellers 
and Chartists, populists and suffragists) but also to questions about popular 
mobilization as opposed to the calculations of elites. This new social history was 
distinguished for shifting historiographical inquiry about past politics to the social 
constituencies with which political movements identified themselves, in the belief 
that this constituted at  least as crucial a context for analyzing politics past and 
present as the "high" political maneuverings of elites which had heretofore defined 
the parameters of the political. 
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The literature produced by this historiographical generation, therefore, was 
preeminently concerned with the problem of politics. Far from displacing political 
with social inquiry, it sought to "re-think the political." In place of the earlier 
restriction of politics to formal political institutions or ideologies understood as 
disembodied sets of ideas, this literature aimed its inquiry a t  the reciprocal 
relationship between a political movement and its popular base of support.8 "The 
social" as a category was meant to denominate what a simple textual investigation 
of political statements and programs never could: namely, that which the 
individual subject actively brings to the political relationship, that part of the 
individual's subjectivity (her or his pieties, loyalties, things held to be sacred, true 
or objectively given) which exists prior to, and is therefore irreducible to, his or 
her subsequent identification with a particular political program or language. 
Social analysis redefined politics, then, as the inevitably problematic attempt to 
bridge this irreducible gap between the subject and the politics with which it 
identified. Politics involved the difficult process of persuasively designating the 
identity of a social constituency in the terms of a political movement with which it 
does not naturally coincide. In the historiography of 19th century England, this 
redeffition of politics in relational terms was manifest in the first attempts9 to 
write a political history of the working class rather than a narrowly conceived 
institutional history of the labour movement. And the resulting scholarship was 
both methodologically innovative and empirically rich. lo 
In practice, however, integrating the social and formal political narratives 
proved exceptionally Micult.  So long as the focus of attention remained on 
"heroic" popular struggles, the "new social history," a t  its best, suggested the 
socially structured imperatives for political actions which remained off-stage. (In 
this regard, even E.P. Thompson's study set the social stage of material 
deprivation and cultural solidarity which made Chartism possible rather than 
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analyzing the difficult process of mobilizing and then sustaining a popular base of 
support. 11) At its worst, the "new social history" reified the priority of "the 
social" as the cause of political identifications. This unfortunate theoretical 
gesture eliminated the problem of political mobilization altogether by collapsing 
formal political language and its institutional embodiment into their social 
determinations. The essential discrepancy distinguishing all political movements 
from their constituent bases of support was crudely elided once "the social" was 
transformed into the causal source of political subjectivity. The practice of politics 
was reduced to a problem of epistomology and whatever remained of political 
language and institutions was reduced to the status of a mere formality, a 
secondary recognition, representation, or reflection of a social identity which was 
already there. 
However, when the attentions of the first generation social historians were 
directed to non-socialist/conservative ideological formations (such as characterized 
popular politics in Britain during the second half of the 19th century), politics did 
occupy, albeit fleetingly, the center stage of analysis. Most notable in this regard 
was the labour aristocracy thesis, elaborated by Eric Hobsbawm, which bore the 
burden of explaining precisely how a conservative, imperialist politics could 
mobilize a working class constituency with which i t  was not naturally 
identified. l2 For a moment, that is, the irreducible break in continuity defining 
any relationship between a political movement and its "social" constituency -- the 
discontinuity or gap which is the very source of politics -- was restored via a 
sophisticated social analysis. But to the extent that "the social" remained reified 
as the natural and therefore true source of political subjectivity, the non- 
natural, conventional identifications of a conservative working class politics could 
only be understood as a form of false consciousness imposed from without, rather 
than the very form of politics itself. The constitutive gap between a socially 
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defined constituency and its political identifications was portrayed as if it marked 
the difference between fact and fiction; it was rendered as though it were the 
product of an error or manipulative deceit rather than the very essence of politics 
as such. 
The mid-1970s witnessed a rebellion within the ranks of a younger 
generation of social historians (of whom Gareth Stedman Jones was one) precisely 
over this tendency to dismiss conservative working class politics as "false" to 
popular interests, as aberrant contradictions of the social determination of politics. 
In the increasingly dreary political climate of the 1970s, the undeniably popular 
appeal of contemporary conservatisms which culminated in Thatcherism and 
haganism made it less and less plausible (and certainly less politically astute) to 
ignore historically effective conservative politics a s  aberrant forms of false 
l i .  consciousness. This second generation of social historians set out therefore to take 
popular conservatism seriously. The literature produced by this younger group of 
historians formed the first sustained critique of the tendency within the old "new 
4 . .  social history" to ignore, deny or evade the importance of politics.13 Strangely 
enough, however, the strategy for rescuing politics from the condescension of a 
theory of false consciousness was to authenticate it, in one manner or another, by 
referring it back to objective, non-political social conditions. The popular 
liberalism, patriotism, imperialism and political passivity of mid to late Victorian 
working people were thereby explained away as rational responses on the part of 
workers to wage differentials, work experience and culture, neighborhood 
experience, the stabilization of capitalist labor relations, etc. -- that is to say, 
rational responses to objective (not to say exclusively economic) social conditions of 
a mature and apparently permanent capitalist economy. More often than not, this 
literature, which proposed to take popular politics more seriously, paradoxically 
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ended up collapsing it back into its social determinations in a manner quite 
analogous to the first generation of social historians. 
Symptomatic of the fate of the political in such studies is Stedman Jones' 
analysis of popular conservatism in "Working-Class Culture and Working-Class 
Politics in London, 1870-1900: Notes on the Remaking of a Working Class." 
Against "standard interpretations" of the period as dominated by the "the rise of 
Labour and the mounting pressure for social reform;" Stedman Jones insists that 
social historians concede that the majority of workers were not socialists, while the 
eventual formation of a working-class party had more to do with defending 
existing trade union privileges, than working-class aspirations for control of state 
and nation.14 The real problematic of the period then becomes the absence of 
"class war" or a combative class politics by the end of the 19th century, contrary 
to the expectations of contemporary observers across the political spectrum. Many 
of these contemporaries anticipated Lenin's invocation of false consciousness in 
attributing socialism's failure to materialize to "a wave of imperialism [which] has 
swept over the country." Popular euphoria a t  the relief of Mafeking, former 
republicans' expressions of allegiance to the monarchy, the popularity of music 
halls over socialist lecturns were all perceived as manifestations of an imperial 
turn to popular political aspirations which dashed socialist hopes as it propelled 
the Conservative Party to electoral victory. l5 
Stedman Jones insists, however, that this failure of socialism, while it had 
political symptoms, was not a political event -- i.e. it was not due to the political 
victory of conservatism in wresting popular support away from socialist 
alternatives. Rather conservatism's "popularity" was a symptom of the de- 
politicization of working class culture after the defeat of the Charter: "What 
Mafeking and other imperial celebrations portended was not so much the 
predominance of the wrong politics among the mass of London workers, but rather 
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their estrangement from political activity as such." Imperialism's appeal did not 
represent the political victory of conservatism, but rather the collapse of popular 
political ambition altogether. "Loyalism," in short, "was a product of apathy. (116 
Popular conservatism in all its manifestations was not, therefore, "really" 
conservative, in the sense of involving the mobilization of working class support for 
conservative political principles. In support of this argument, Stedman Jones 
retraces ostensibly conservative political behavior on the part of workers to its 
genuinely social (which are juxtaposed to political) motivations. Mafeking 
celebrations were expressions of relieved concern for working-class soldiers a t  the 
front, rather than any "politically defined" support for the war or imperial 
aggression as such. Working class support for Conservative candidates in the 
"khaki election" of 1900 reflected "local and material" interests in defending 
housing and employment opportunities from the perceived threat of immigrant 
and foreign competition. l 
The argument then shifts to the efforts of (primarily Liberal) middle-class 
philanthropists to "civilize" outcast London -- the assumption apparently being 
that workers would have to have been manipulated or "socially controlled" in 
order to genuinely embrace a conservative politics. Stedman Jones, therefore, 
refutes the possibility of such a genuinely popular conservatism by demonstrating 
that the working class was fundamentally impermeable to the political and 
cultural interventions of its social superiors. Here again, while the working classes 
of this period were clearly not revolutionary, neither were they afTected by this 
civilizing missionary onslaught: "The results of fifty years of Christian missionary 
activity had been insigmficant." Church attendance, like voting Conservative, 
"was generally for material reasons." Temperance made little inroad into 
working-class culture in London, although the provincial story was one of greater 
success. And workers deployed the fruits of what thrift they managed "to 
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demonstrate self-respect" in the form of elaborate funerals and Sunday-best suits, 
rather than in accordance with middle-class-valued "calculations of utility. 1118 
Popular conservatism is thusly dismissed; in its place Stedman Jones posits 
as the dominant characteristic of working class consciousness of the period a 
widespread apathy with regards to political matters, an apathy incapable of 
generating a socialist will to power and superficially vulnerable (as opposed to 
genuinely attracted) to the romantic enticements of Empire, Crown and Toryism. 
The origins of this apathy were in themselves partly political -- a defensive retreat 
by the working class after the traumatic defeat of the Charter, a resigned political 
acceptance of the permanence of industrial capitalism. However, the bulk of 
Stedman Jones' characteristically artful analysis rests on social factors. The social 
conditions which had nurtured radical and Chartist politics during the first half of 
the nineteenth century -- the "work-centred" culture of the London artisanate -- 
were being eroded during the second half of the century. De-~killing, sweating, 
and provincial competition threatened the position of the shrinking force of skilled 
labor, which "became increasingly defensive and concerned to protect itself from 
below as much as from above."19 The shifting social geography of work and 
leisure also undermined the institutional practices which had characterized 
working class politics during the Chartist period. Skilled workers were 
increasingly likely to commute to work from the suburbs, which lessened their 
contacts after work with their immediate co-workers. As wives increasingly 
withdrew from waged labor outside the home, the latter was more and more likely 
to become "a depoliticized haven." Leisure time increased with the shortening of 
the legal work-day, but the most popular beneficiary of working class leisure, the 
pub, "would no longer be the trade pub near the workplace, but the 'local'." With 
neighbors of different trades, pub conversation was less likely to turn to "trade 
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matters, more likely to reflect common interests, politics to a certain extent, but 
more often, sport and entertainment. 1120 
The "common interests" and sensibilities around which this new working- 
class culture was constructed are highlighted in the popular appeal of music-hall 
entertainments. The "sham opulence" of the halls themselves afforded temporary 
escape from the material deprivations of working-class experience. At the same 
time, the entertainments were "strongly rooted in the realities of working-class 
life." The class system was the subject of irony and criticism; however, while "not 
considered to be just," it was accepted as inevitable. Fatalism, in fact, was the 
dominant theme of the entertainments, a characteristic of working-class culture 
attributed to high levels of unemployment which characterized London working- 
class existence. 
And it is this fatalism which functions in Stedman Jones' argument to 
exonerate the late Victorian working class of "genuine" attachment to the 
conservative principles by which it was periodically mobilized. For Stedman Jones 
(writing as a social historian) does not differ from his predecessors in assuming 
that a genuine popular conservatism would be "false" to popular interests, and 
could therefore only come into existence as a result of bourgeois manipulation. In 
the place of the successful seduction of working class loyalties by bourgeois politics, 
he contests the "sincerity" of popular conservative commitments. This is precisely 
the point in Stedman Jones' argument that politics gets sacrificed to its social 
context, and it is somewhat ironic that the price of social reductionism is highest 
when the politics are most unsavory. His argument,.of course, shares with other 
arguments based on the possibility of an authentic political expression, the 
difficulty of documenting the absence of sincerity. Stedman Jones ultimately has 
to deprive the working class of this conservative period of political agency 
altogether in order to make his case; in place of the active appropriation of 
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conservative identifications, he posits a structurally determined deformation, a 
concession to the power of advanced industrial capitalism and the mind-numbing 
affects of poverty. 
In support of this latter, Stedman Jones approvingly cites Mayhew's 
assessment of the political potential, or lack thereof, endemic to the material 
deprivations characteristic of working class experience: 
Where the means of sustenance and comfort are fixed, the human 
being becomes conscious of what he has to depend upon. If, however 
his means be uncertain -- abundant a t  one time, and deficient at 
another -- a spirit of speculation or gambling with the future will be 
induced, and the individual gets to believe in "luck" and "fate" as the 
arbiters of his happiness rather than to look upon himself as 'the 
architect of his fortunes' -- trusting to 'chance' rather than %%own 
powers and foresight to relieve him a t  the hour of necessity. 
There are references throughout the article to the "local and material" character 
of working-class concerns; explicit support for larger political issues, such as 
imperialism, is interpreted as "passive acquiescence"; the protections afforded by 
pension funds and friendly societies are considered "too abstract and intangible" to 
attract the investments of working families "whose whole efforts were 
concentrated on getting through the week ahead without being beset by disaster"; 
politics in general is referred to as too "abstract and remote" to interest the typical 
working man; in short the social conditions of working class existence during the 
second half of the 19th century had so shrunken the imaginative capacity of 
working people, so compressed their "horizons of possibility" as to preclude 
political ambitions altogether.23 In place of political action, there emerged the 
"culture of consolation" epitomized by the music hall, and eventually a labourist 
politics bent on welfare not power.24 
All of which is to suggest that the early Stedman Jones exonerated the 
British working class of conservatism a t  the expense of the political capacities of 
working people themselves. The sociological framework which informed his 
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analysis is salvaged only a t  the sacrifice of the genuine piety of popular 
attachment to Empire and Crown, religion and respectability. For while working 
class experience might generate an apathetic withdrawal from political 
aspirations, the only positive political loyalties i t  might generate would be 
socialist. The converse, of course, is that a genuine "autonomous" non-socialist 
politics could never effectively give expression to working class experience. 
Stedman Jones restores, in other words, a perfect continuity between the socially 
defined subject and the politics with which he or she is identified. He thereby 
defuses the contradictions of false consciousness implied in the labour aristocracy 
thesis, but only by denying that the discrepancy between a working class politics 
and its social constituency really exists. 
i .  And in this respect Hobsbawm's analyses of conservative working class 
politics have always been more satisfying than Stedman Jones'. For while 
Hobsbawm may have reduced this constitutive discrepancy to the status of an 
externally imposed error or manipulative deceit, he nevertheless has always been 
attuned to its real political effects. Stedman Jones, on the other hand, eliminates 
the discrepancy completely by suggesting that it was an illusory difference 
between what working people said (cynical expressions of support for empire, 
Liberal philanthropy, Toryism, etc.) and what they really meant (rational 
responses to social conditions) when they said it. This configuration of the problem 
flattens politics to the status of an adequate expression of authentic social 
conditions and in the process obscures the real insight of the labour aristocracy 
thesis: namely, that politics is not a matter of adequate expression, that politics is 
the designation of a human relationship between a constituency and a political 
movement which are not by nature coincident and which are, therefore, never 
fully identical to one another.25 
In the decade between writing "Working-Class Culture and Working-Class 
Politics" and "Rethinking Chartism," Stedman Jones' theoretical framework 
underwent a striking reversal. Perhaps as a result of Mrs. Thatcher's increasingly 
impregnable hold on popular support, Stedman Jones has come to accept, circa 
1983, the authenticity of the other-than-material imaginings of popular 
constituencies. Properly frustrated by sociological imperatives which voided 
popular politics of its content, the Stedman Jones of "Rethinking Chartism" now 
insists that the analysis of political movements must begin with the formal content 
of political discourse. 26 
Exhibiting the theoretical integrity which required his social historical 
methodology to engage with the aberrantly conservative working class culture in 
the late 19th century, Stedman Jones directs his anti-sociological attentions 
towards one of the most heroic and radical political moments in the history of the 
British working class -- Chartism. Chartism was both politically militant and 
strikingly homogeneous in social terms -- the combination of which has facilitated 
the interpretation of the movement as a (albeit immature) stage in the working 
class's political evolution towards socialism. According to Stedrnan Jones, 
however, this social interpretation of Chartism has tended "to neglect the political 
form of the movement and thus to render obscure and inconsequential the 
reasoning that underlay the demand for the The results have been 
destructive of a coherent understanding of Chartism's origins and the timing of its 
collapse. For Chartism was explicitly about political power -- universal suffrage 
was prescribed as the solution to the socio-economic problems of "the people." And 
this forthrightly political content of Chartism betrays what Stedman Jones finds to 
be a gross inconsistency in the social historical approach. For, neither the 
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prescription nor its beneficiaries, correspond to the political aspirations which a 
properly "class conscious" working class should exhibit, according to the 
sociological framework informing the bulk of social historical analysis. Stedman 
Jones, in other words, has discovered in Chartism an incoherence, a contradictory 
gulf between a political movement and the socially defined constituency with 
which it is putatively identified very much like the more obvious contradiction 
implicit in the labour aristocracy thesis concerning late nineteenth century popular 
conservatism. And "Rethinking Chartism" is his attempt to resolve this 
contradiction implicit in sociological approaches to Chartist political behavior just 
as "Working Class Culture" was an attempt to resolve the contradictory 
discrepancies riddling the labour aristocracy thesis. 
Freed of the imperatives of the sociological framework (imperatives which 
necessitated that he restore the perfect coherence of political subjectivity by 
collapsing it back into its social determinations) Stedman Jones now diffuses the 
incoherence by attributing it to the illusory effects of the sociological prejudices of 
historians themselves. The "axiomatic presumption" that "economic power is the 
cause and political power the effect" has blinded social historians to the fact that 
Chartism is part and parcel of a larger discursive tradition of radical politics which 
predates the the social and economic transformations of the industrial revolution. 
According to Stedman Jones, this temporal priority of radical discourse 
demonstrates that the language of Chartism cannot be explained as the 
epiphenomenol effect, or representation, of prior social identities and economic 
interests. On the contrary, the language itself must have causal priority; i t  must 
itself be considered the causal source of the subject's identity and interest. 
Language, according to Stedman Jones, "prefigures" or "creates" subjective needs 
and demands which it then   orchestrate^."^^ Hence there is no need to refer 
outside-of language to some objective ground determining the subject. The 
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individual subject is whole, coherent and self-identical because i t  is determined 
entirely within the circle of language. To discover the identity of the subject one 
merely has to examine the "text" of the Chartist program. Hence Stedman Jones 
claims "kthinking Chartism" to be the analytical application of a "non-referential 
conception of language to the study of Chartist speeches and writing ... exploring 
the, systematic relationships between the terms and propositions within the 
language rather than setting particular propositions into direct relation to a 
putative experiential reality of which they are assumed to be the expression. 1129 
Chartist language "was first and foremost a vocabulary of political exclusion 
whatever the social character of those excluded." As such "it could never be the 
ideology of a specific class." That Chartism's adherents were predominantly 
working class was a function of the inclusion of the middle classes in the political 
nation in 1832 rather than the progress of class f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The radical as 
opposed to "class" character of the Chartist analysis was its prescription of 
essentially political solutions to the social problems of its adherents -- in particular, 
the monopolization of political power by "idlers" was blamed for obstructing the 
"fair" reward of labor ("the distinction was not primarily between ruling and 
exploited classes in an economic sense, but rather between the beneficiaries and 
the victims of corruption and monopoly political power"),31 the solution t o  which 
was of course the extension of the franchise to "the people." The middle classes 
were suspect in this analysis not for their economic role but for their exercise of 
political power in a selfish and immoral manner (factory owners who supported 
the Charter, for example, were revered). Chartism owed its popular purchase 
during the 1830s to state policies which more than matched its suspicions, policies 
which "did indeed signify the most consequential attempt to dismantle or 
transform the decentralized treatment of problems of crime, poverty and social 
order characteristic of the eighteenth century state": 
The New Poor Law, and the assisted migration of southern paupers to 
northern towns, both of which were considered part of a plot to lower 
wages by means of centralized non-representative state bodies, the 
Municipal Corporations Act and the extension of the police system, 
which effectively excluded the working classes from participation in 
local government, the refusal of factory legislation, the denial of 
protection to the handloom weavers, and the attack upon trade 
unions, could $,J be seen in Fielden's words as part of "the highroad to 
tyrannyn . . . 
Conversely, Chartism lost credibility when, in the 1840s, state policies ceased to 
conform to its cynical expectations. Government attentions not only shifted to 
what were perceived as less sinister areas of legislation (e.g. public education and 
sanitation), but a series of Acts were passed by a non-democratic Parliament 
directed at precisely those sorts of immoral abuses of the economic system that 
Chartism would have expected it to defend. The Mines Act of 1842, the Joint 
Stock Company Act, the Bank Charter Act, the repeal of the Corn Laws, the 
Factory Act and Ten Hours Act dealt a massive blow to "the radical conception of 
the corrupt, unrepresentative and self-interested state," which "proved fatal to the 
conviction and self-certainty of the language of Chartism, especially in the period 
after 1842, when some real measure of prosperity returned to the economy. 033 
The political stabilization of the 1850s and 60s, particularly the incorporation of 
the working classes in the Liberal Party, then, does not require reference to 
changes in the social composition or economic situation of the working classes 
which characterize the social interpretation advanced in Stedman Jones' earlier 
work. Liberalism represented the political Establishment's appropriation of the 
moral and political critique of Chartism, thereby making itself Chartism's natural 
heir. Hence there is no need to treat the language of Chartism as the "symbolic or 
anachronistic" representation of an external social reality.34 
However, while Stedman Jones reclaims the explanation of Chartism's rise 
and fall from reduction to socio-economic changes associated with the industrial 
revolution, his own explanations rely on reference to changes in the posture of the 
state which are quite obviously external to the language of Chartism. It turns 
out to be these extra-linguistic changes in the state which drive the narrative of 
"Rethinking Chartism." Far from providing a "non-referential" treatment of 
Chartist language in which the language itself constitutes the subject, Stedman 
Jones has told the story of Chartism as a language which more or less adequately 
represented the prevailing structure of the state, and which then became 
anachronistic once that state structure changed: 
Once the evidence suggested that real reform was possible within the 
unreformed system, that the state did not wholly correspond to the 
radical picture ... then radical ideology could be expected to lose 
purchase ... Chartism began to fail when a gulf op ed up between its 
premises and the perceptions of its constituency. 58 
If, in other words, we take his narrative seriously, i t  is the subject's perceptions of 
the objective reality which determine their appropriation of a particular political 
language and not the language which determines the identity of the political 
subject. 
Stedman Jones' story does not therefore do what it claims to be doing. At 
the end of his narrative he once again encounters what all his scholarly efforts 
have been mobilized to explain away, namely a gulf or discrepancy between the 
premises of a political program and the actual subjectivity of the constituency with 
which i t  is identified. The only way he can diffuse the discrepancy is to violate his 
-declared linguistic method and appeal to the extra-linguistic fact of the state. He 
must call upon the state a t  the last minute as .a kind of deus a nachina to 
explain the break in continuity between a political program and the constituency i t  
supposedly "created. " 
19 
And this disparity between Stedman Jones' declared method and the actual 
scholarship produced may prove to be the most interesting aspect of "Rethinking 
 harti ism."^^ For, it finds a telling analogue in the scholarship predicated on 
social determinism such as the original labour aristocracy thesis. Both frameworks 
start out from premises which propose the perfect continuity between an 
individual's political subjectivity and the politics with which he or she comes to be 
identified (the sociological approach by collapsing subjectivity into its social 
determinations and the discursive-political approach by collapsing it into its 
linguistic determinations). But the deployment of these premises in empirical case 
studies generates abberrant examples of dicontinuity betweeen the subject and its 
political identifications, discontinuities which can only be resolved by violating the 
premises with which the argument began. The sociology must call on the political, 
just as the structural linguistics must call upon extra-linguistic facts as their 
respective aces-in-the-hole to restore coherence to their shattered narratives.37 
Both the new discursive-political history and the history predicated on social 
determinism hold in common an impatient resistance to the ambivalence implied 
in the discontinuity inhering between a political movement and the contituency 
which it has mobilised. To paraphrase Paul de Man, the implied function of both 
the sociological and the discursive-political methods is to do away a t  all costs with 
this ambivalence which makes a movement irreducible to its contituency and a 
constituency irreducible to the movement with which it is identifiedSt8 What we 
have been suggesting is that it is this very ambivalence, this fundamental 
discrepancy constitutive of all political relationships which gives politics its 
generative, creative power. And therefore, it is the steadfast avoidance of this 
irreducible gap which accounts for the downgrading of politics in so much 
scholarship. 
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In the case of Stedman Jones, this avoidance takes the special form of a 
resistance to the referential, metaphorical function of language -- a resistance 
clearly in evidence when he states categorically that language is "non-referential" 
and "pre-figurative." To our minds, the aim of a critical linguistics (particularly as 
manifested in the so-called deconstructive approaches) is directed precisely against 
this transfer which would make language itself the prefigurative stable source of 
meaning and identity. The procedure of a critical linguistics, far from denying the 
referentiality of language, raises its referential function to the center stage of 
analysis.39 For no part of language, even down to the word, exists as a 
meaningful unit in and of itself; it must always consist of the designation of one 
thing in terms of something else, the identification of one thing in terms of 
something different. There is, therefore, an ineradicable ambiguity or difference, 
running like a fault line between between the "name" and the "thing named." A 
fault line which represents the potential instability of any conventional 
identification of one thing in the terms of another with which it has no ;a priori, 
natural c o n n e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  This gap inhabiting the very structure of language 
corresponds exactly to the gap distinguishing a constituency from the politics with 
which it comes to be identified. 
When the two methods, sociological and discursive-political, actually 
confront the presence of the break in continuity distinguishing a political subject 
from its politics, they portray it as if it were a temporary abberation imposed from 
without, as if it were a momentary violation of the natural order of things. And 
by portraying it in these terms they both ensure that the complexity of political 
relations will not be taken seriously. For in each case the individual subject, him 
or herself, is considered to exist as a stable, fixed entity prior to the ambiguities 
which the abberrant relation imposes. 
2 1 
This, then, is the common error of method which leads to the denial or 
evasion of the political; it is the failure to begin analysis by taking the subject 
seriously as an entity which is always already shot through with the complexities, 
ambivalences and instabilities that the structure of political relations implies. The 
problem with the old new social history was not that it collapsed political 
language, institutions, or ideology back into the social. (Indeed, as the labour 
aristocracy thesis indicates the constitutive force of an autonomous politics is often 
all too present in sociological approaches.41) Rather, the problem was that it 
collapsed the subject (her or himself) into its social circumstances. "The social" 
was (perhaps more often than not) reified into the causal source of subjective 
political identities, transforming the subject, in turn, into a fured, self-identical, 
and therefore knowable entity.42 The recent revisionist attempts, epitomized in 
the work of Gareth Stedman Jones, to treat political languages as if they were the 
autonomous, prefigurative sources of political subjectivity, commit exactly the 
same error. The subject is collapsed into its linguistic circumstances lending it the 
coherence and stability of an inert object. 
The "individual" subject is not inert. I t  is agent exactly to the degree that 
it is already imbued with the complex ambivalences of political relations prior to 
its "situation" in any particular set of social or linguistic circumstances. The 
double irony here is that i t  was social analysis which first posited this complexity 
of the individual subject. And as long as the new discursive-political revision 
supresses the complexity, it will not restore politics to the analysis of human 
affairs. It will continue to refine the strategies through which the problem of 
politics has always been avoided. 
Footnotes 
1 Most of the work within this revisionist project defines "politics" in terms of 
formal political institutions, ideas, and movements. The social history project 
against which it is constructed, however, was also very much about "politics," if 
understood in the broader sense of the relations of power operating in the social 
formation as a whole. As should become obvious in the course of our argument we 
do not share either the revisionists' nonpolitical depiction of their social historical 
forerunners, nor their own claims to have "politicized" the analysis of popular 
culture of the social order. 
2 The "linguistic turn" has pride of place among the other currents, for i t  is 
possible to argue that the various socio-economic reductionisms were in fact 
modeled upon a precritical linguistics which viewed language as the secondary, 
symbolic represention, reflection, paraphrase, etc. of a primary reality. Just as 
the "linguistic turn" seeks to give some measure of autonomy and constitutive 
authority to language, so the other revisionist currents seek to give autonomy and 
authority to institutions, to the state, and to the law. The literature involved in 
each of these projects is already enormous and much of the work does not fit 
neatly within the categories mentioned, but for examples of the "New 
Institutionalism" and the related project to "bring the state back in" see the 
excellent work of Jonathan Zeitlin, for example, "Shop Floor Bargaining and the 
State: A Contradictory Relationship," in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Shop . . 
and the State: Historical and Com~aa t ive  Pers~ectives (1984), 
-el and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass 
Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-Century 
Industrialization," in Past and Present, 108 (August 1985), pp. 133-76; see the 
very influential work of Theda Skocpol which criticizes both marxist and liberal 
methods for reducing the state to a mere representation of an underlying socio- 
economic essence: "Bringing the State Back In," I t e m  (SSRC), 36: 1-2 (June, 
1982), 1-8; "'Bringing the State Back In': Strategies of Analysis in the Current . . 
Research," in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, Bring- State Back I n  
(Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1985), 6-37; "Political Response to 
Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New 
Deal," Politics and Soc 
. . iety 10 (1980), pp.155-201; and Michael Mann, The Sour= 
of Social Power, Vol. 1: A Historv of Power from the Bemnn . . inp to A.D. 1760 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) for a cohparable critique of 
"society-centered" explanations of power; the return to institutional and "state- 
centered" approaches can also be seen in the revival of interest in Karl Polanyi's 
work. See his The Great T itical and Economic Orians of 
. . ransformation: The Pol 
Our Time (Boston, 195 7) which offers a compelling critique of socio-econom-ic 
reductionism, and see Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, "Beyond the 
Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Science of Karl Polanyi," in Skocpol (ed.), Vision 
and Method in Historical Sociolog (Cambridge, 1984), 47-84. See also the 
introductory piece by Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg in their edited volume, 
Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and 
the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) for a critique of 
socio-economic reductionism from a political science point of view; and Charles 
Tilly, Bip Structures, Large Processes, and Hu Com~arisons (New York: The 
Russel Sage Foundation, 1984) for a critique of the reification of "society" into the 
ontological ground of social science explanation, and see Tilly's earlier work which 
anticipates some of the recent dicsussion concerning the state as an autonomous 
actor, for example, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in 
Tilly (ed.), The Formatbn of hhlikml States in Western Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), 3-83. Two excellent examples of the new 
history of the law in British History are Joanna Innes and John Styles, "The 
Crime Wave: Recent Writing on Crime and Criminal Justice in Eighteenth 
Century England," in The Journal of British Stu . . c.&x 25 (1986), 380-435, and the 
introductory piece in John Brewer and John Styles (eds.), An Ungovernabk 
P P - r i e s  
(London: Hutchinson, 1980). Both are formulated as critiques of earlier histories 
which tended to reduce the law to the status of an expression of socio-economic 
determinations or to the status of a tool wielded by the dominant social class. 
From the neo-marxist traditions of Gramscian and Althusserian interpretation see 
the excellent and important early essay by Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, "Why 
Does Social History . . Ignore Politics," Soc ial History 5 (1980), 249-72; and Bob 
Jessop, The Ca~italist  State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York: New 
York University Press, 1982). For an exemplary theoretical work on the linguistic 
or discursive approach to politics (which in fact comes out of an earlier 
engagement with Althusser and Gramsci) see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, . . gemonv and Socialist Strategv: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics . . (London: 
Verso, 1985). 
3 The term is from Scott Lash and John Urry, "The Dissolution of the 
Social?" . . in Mark Wardell and Stephen Turner (eds.), weal Theory in 
sition (Landon: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 95-109. 
4 This shift from sympathy to antipathy for the sociological approach can be 
detected conceptually, for instance, in the shift from notions of the relative 
autonomy of the state (associated with Althusser's original formulations) to recent 
considerations of the state as a fully autonomous, self-determining actor. For 
discussions favorable to this shift see the aforementioned work of Skocpol and see 
Fred Block, "Beyond Relative Autonomy." The shift might also be registered 
biographically, for instance in the careers of scholars whose early work was framed 
self-consciously by the sociological method and whose later work, often in the mode 
of a self-critique, took critical aim a t  that method. An examplary figure whose 
work is extremely challenging in both its old sociological guise and its more recent . . post-sociological guise, is Ernesto Laclau. See his earlier work in Politics and 
ldeolow in W x i s t  Theory (London: New Left Books, 1977) and his later 
collaborative effort with Chantal Mouffe, m e m o n y  and Soclalxsf S t r a a  . . The 
quote is borrowed from Eley and Nield, "Why Does Social History Ignore Politics?" 
which was formulated in a manner quite sympathetic to the contributions of a 
social history. 
5 Stedman Jones outlines his intellectual trajectory in his introduction to 
Languages of Class (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), a collection of 
his essays, of which "Working-Class Culture and Working-Class Politics in London, 
1870-1900: Notes on the %making of a Working Class" (pp. 179-238, originally 
.published in the Journal of Social His- 7, 4 (Summer 1974)) .typifies the social 
historical approach to popular politics, while "Rethinking Chartism" (pp. 90-178) 
presents Stedman Jones' critique of this approach in the historiography on 
Chartism. 
6 Ibid., p. 21. 
7 Ibid., pp. 22, 24. 
8 We want to stress the importance of this theoretical contribution. Politics 
comes into existence only as a reciprocal relationship, the appropriate model or 
metaphor for which is the relationship between a party or movement and the 
constituency with which it is identified. 
9 By "first attempts," we mean first attempts made within the mainstream 
academy. Non-academic marxist historians had since the turn of the century been 
sketching out the plausible redifinitions of politics, positing it as a relationship 
between a base of support and the institutional and ideological forms with which 
that base was identified. The most important theorist in this regard was obviously 
Gramsci. But see Perry Anderson's Considerations On Western Marxism (London: 
Verso, 1976) for an interesting and useful introduction to the large literatures of 
marxist social analysis produced outside of the academy. 
10 The works of E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm stand out most notably. 
See their respective classics: The Making of the English Working Class (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1963) and Labouring. Men (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1964). 
11 If Thompson is guilty of this charge, particularly with respect to Tlas: 
Making, he has always remained theoretically attuned to relational quality of 
politics. One only has to read the prefatory remarks in 2 . k ~  Making to see this. 
So, it is incomprehensible to us that his work has recently been characterized as 
typical of reductionist marxism. 
12 The most influential formulatlion of this argument in British history is in 
Eric Hobsbawm, "The Labour Aristocracy," Labouring Men. 
13 ~he'literature produced by this younger generation was often of the highest 
quality: see for example, Robert Q. Gray, The Labour Aristocracy in Victorian 
Edinbur& (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Geoffrey Crossick, An Artisan Elite 
An Victor~an Society (London: Croom and Helm, 1978); Gareth Stedman Jones, 
"Working Class Culture"; and see also the interesting exchange between Alistair 
%id and H. F. Moorehouse published in the pages of -1 Historv from January 
1978 to October 1979. 
14 Stedman Jones, languages of Class, pp. 237-38. 
15 Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
16 Ibid., p. 182. 
18 Ibid., pp. 196-200. 
19 Ibid., p. 215. 
20 Ibid., p. 220. 
21 The connections posed between unemployment and political apathy, 
however, .have ramifications far beyond London -- according to Stedman Jones,. the 
values of the music hall "reflected the general development of the English working 
class after 1870" (p. 235). 
22 Mayhew, London Labour, vol. 2,.325; cited in Stedman Jones, W e s  of 
Shss, p. 234. 
23 Stedman Jones, m e s  of Class, pp. 180, 181, 196, 202, 214, 215. 
24 Ibid., pp. 237-8. 
25 See Nietzsche's early formulation of this: "...what matters with words is 
never truth, never the adequate expression.. .one designates only the relations of 
things to man, and to express them one calls on the boldest metaphors." In 
Portable N&zsche, Walter Kaufmann (trans. and ed.), (Middlesex: Penguin 
1976), pp. 45-6. 
26 "In contrast to the prevalent social-historical approach to chartism, whose 
starting point is some conception of class or occupational consciousness, it [this 
essay] argues that the ideology of Chartism cannot be constructed in abstraction 
from its linguistic form. An analysis of Chartist ideology must start from what 
Chartists actually said or wrote, the terms in which they addressed each other or 
their opponents," Stedman Jones, w e s  of Cl- p. 94. At the root of 
Stedman Jones' disillusion with the sociological framework surely lies the 
consolidation of Mrs. Thatcher's hold on popular support in Britain and the failure 
of Labour to adequately contest her appeal, taken on board theoretically as 
indicative of the power of politics and the fragility of social experience in the 
formation of popular political consciousness. 
27 Ibid., p. 99. 
30 Ibid., p. 104. 
32 Ibid., pp. 174-5. 
33 Ibid., pp. 166-7, 176-7. 
34 Ibid., p. 105. 
35 Ibid., pp. 106-7. 
36 We do not mean to criticize the disparity as a simpleminded inconsistency 
on Stedrnan Jones' part. Indeed it is due to the discrepancy, this contradiction 
running through his argument, that he raises the most interesting issue 
concerning the changing mode of the political relation between the state and 
popular groups. 
37 Few have recognized the systematic disparity between the method and 
.empirical statements of scholarship premised on the social determination of 
political subjectivity. E.P. Thompson, however, was in this regard as in many 
others exceptional. As long ago as 1963, in the famous preface to The Making af 
$he English Working Class he noted that this paradoxical disparity may have 
been the defrning trait of sociological determinisms: "There is today an ever 
present temptation to suppose that class is a thing ... assumed to have a real 
existence, defined as so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of 
production. Once this is assumed it becomes possible to deduce a class 
consciousness which 'it' ought to have (but seldom does have) if 'it' were properly 
aware of its real interests. There is a cultural [political] superstructure, through 
which this recognition dawns in inefficient ways. These cultural [political] lags and 
distortions are a nuisance, so that it is easy to pass from this to some theory of 
substitution: the party, or sect, or theorist who discloses class consciousness not as 
it is, but as it ought to be" (p. 10). 
38 Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Blindness," in Blindness and Insight 
(London: Methuen and Co., 1983), p. 111. 
39 de Man, "Resistance to Theory," in his Resistance to Theorv (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1986), pp. 6-1 1. 
40 We owe a large debt to de Man's literary theory which is just as much a 
theory of politics and ideology. In particular we have borrowed from "Resistance 
to Theory," and his essays on Nietzsche and Rousseau collected in Allegories of 
Reading (New Haven: Yale, 1979) and "The Rhetoric of Blindness." 
41 In fact, the history of social analysis is littered with comparable examples of 
scholarly work which, starting out from the most rigorous of social determinisms, 
ends up with entirely political explanations. See E.P. Thompson's early critique of 
this tendency in both marxist and parsonian sociology, in The Making, pp. 10-12. 
And see Eley and Nield, "Why Does Social History Ignore Politics?" for a really 
fascinating juxtaposition of British marxist historians who represent the 
revolutionary German SPD as normal historical development with German liberal 
historians who represent the reformist Labour Party of England as the model of 
normal development -- each group of social historians explaining the absence of 
normal development in their own national context by reference to some 
manipulative, political intervention from above (e.g., labour aristocracy, leninist 
party, repressive state apparatus, etc.). See Eley, "Joining Two Histories: The 
SPD and the German Working Class 1860-1914," in From Unification to Nazism; 
interpretin? t m r m a n  Past (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 17 1- 199 
for a further elaboration of this phenomenon in German historiography. 
42 This reification of the priority of the social into causal priority may vitiate 
much scholarship, but it is not necessary to social analysis. Social analysis, as we 
understand it to have been deployed by its best practitioners, does not designate 
any categorical difference between a phenomenol social identity and its 
epiphenomenol political representation. "The social" merely designates the fact 
that the individual subject is already imbued with prior loyalties, pieties, etc., 
before her or his identification with a particular politics. It designates a contingent 
temporal priority -- a priority which far from radically separating the social from 
politics, implies that the subject is already actively political and that therefore any 
particular politics which seeks to mobilise his or her support will have to refer 
back to that political agency and persuasively take it into account. The first error 
of method is to suppose that this "refering back" functions as a principle of 
representation -- for that supposition reinstates the categorical distinction between 
politics and society, between language and reality which the social analysis put 
into question in the first place. "The social" then, is not that part of human 
existence which is determined outside of language or politics. I t  is a concept which 
designates precisely those conventions of language which are the most deeply 
rooted, which appear after long usage to be valid, obligatory and true to people -- 
what Gramsci called the organic component of the social order and what Marx 
called the "mode of production." An example of the social -- that peculiar form of 
property relations in which property is conventionally designated in terms of 
capital, that strange mode of production in which the meaning and value of most, 
if not all, things is measured in terms of one common denominator, money. Does 
i t  still need to said, so many years after Althusser's contributions, that by the 
concept "mode of production" Marx meant precisely to subvert the notion that 
people are economically ra ther  than politically determined? See a brief 
discussion of the gross misreading of Marx in David Mayfield, "State or Society: 
Three Essays on the Contradictions in the State Theory" CSST Working Paper 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, forthcoming). 
"OGR-4Y ON TEE 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOCIAL TRANSFOXM!!TIONS 
UNIVERSITY OF MlCHfGAN . . 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
The Progrvn on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations is 
an inter-discipliaary research program at the University of 
Nichiga~. Its faculty associates are drawn primarily from the 
de9artments of Anthropology, History, and Sociology, but also ---- inrllia- - -- neabers of several other programs in the humanities and 
ssclal sciences. Its mission is to stinulate new inter- 
2isciplizary thinking research about all kinds of social 
transforzations in a wide range of present and past societies. 
CSST Working Papers report current research by faculty =d 
graduate student associates of the program; many will be 
published elsewhere after revision. Working Papers are available 
for a fee of $1.00 for papers m d e r  40 pages and for $2.00 for 
longer papers. The program will photocopy out-of-print Working 
Papers at ccst (S.05 per page). To request copies of Working 
Papers, write to Co~~parative Study of Social Tr~sformatfons, 
4010 LSA Building, University of Michigan, Axcn Arbor, ??I 48109- 
1382 or call (313) 936-1595. .. 
. .. . 
1 "Frogram in Comparative Study of Social Transforaations," by 
W i l l i a ~  E.  Sewell, Jr., Terrence J. Mc3onald, Sherry E. 
Ortncr, and Jeffery M. Paige, May 1987, 15 pages. Also CRSO 
Working Paper #344.  
2 "Lzbor Xistory, Uneven Development, and the Autonomy of 
Politfcs: The Dockworkers of ~'ineteenth-Century Marseille," 
5y William H .  Sewell, Jr., July 1987, 45 pages. Also C?.SO 
Working Pager #346. (Xow in print as "Uceven Development, 
tke Autonomy of Politics and.the Dockworkers of Nineteenth- 
Century Marseille," Anerlc= Historical Review 93:3 (Jlzie 
1988), pp. 604-37.) 
3 "Coffes, Ccpper, and Class Conflict in Central Anericz and 
Chile: A Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars In Chile  an^ 
Zeitlin and Ratcliff's Landlords a ~ d  Ca~italists," by 
T P ~ F - ~ I ~  Y .  P z i ~ e ,  Saptkaber 198?, 10 pages. A l s ~  CRSO - -- -" 
Workiag Paper #34?. 
4 "In Searck of the Sourgeois Revolution: The Particslarlties 
of C e r a ~ n  History," by Geoffrey Eley, September 198?, 6.: 
>ages. Also CRSO Working Paper ?F350. 
5 "The Burdens of Urban History: The Theory of the State In 
Recent American Social History," by Terrence Mc2onald. May 
19S8, 5 O  pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 4P355. 
6 "uistory, Sccioloqy, 2nd Theories of Orgzcization," by Mayer 
? 3  ? +  y .  ,;,,, yg57 198g, 4 3  p a ~ e s .  Also C3SC Wcrklng ?=-=- -P -- + 3 5 ? .  
7 "Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some 
Preliminary Demographic Speculations," by Maris A. 
Vinovskis, May 1988, 55 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 
#358 .. 
8 -"Revolution and the Agrarian Bourgeoisie in Nicaragua," by 
Jeffery M. Paige, 42 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #363. 
9 I1Nationallsm and Class as Factors in the Revolution of 
1917," by Ronald G .  Suny, October 1988, 42 pages. Also CRSO 
Working Paper #365. 
10 "The Original Caste: Power, History, and Hierarchy in South 
Asia," by Nicholas B. Dirks, October 1988, 30 pages. Also 
CRSO Workfng Paper #367. 
11 "The Invention of Caste.: Civil Society in Colonial India," 
by Nicholas 5. Dirks, October 1988, 24 pages. Also CRSO 
Working Paper #368. 
12 "Sociology as a Discipline: Quasi-Science and Quasi- 
Humanities," by Mayer Zald, October 1988, 43 pages. Also 
CRSO Working Paper #369. 
13 "Constraints on Professional Power in Soviet-Type Society: 
lnsights from the Solidarity Period in ~olahd," by Michael 
D. Kennedy and Konrad Sadkowski, November 1988, 37 pages. 
Also CRSO Working Paper #371. 
14 "Evolutionary Changes in Chinese Culture," by Martin K. 
Whyte, November 1988, 20 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 
#372. 
15 "World Market, Class Conflict, and Rural Coercion in Post- 
Colonial Buenos Aires," by Karl Monsma, November 1988, 22 
pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #373. 
15 "Ritual and Resistance: Subversion as a Social Fact," by 
Nicholas B. Dirks, December 1988, 39 pages. Also CRSO 
Working Paper #375. 
17 "Social Transformations of Gender in Andean South America: 
A Working Annotated Bibliography," by Janise Hurfig, 
December 1988, 24 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #376. 
18 "Labour History--Social History--Alltaqsqeschichte: 
Experience, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday. A 
New Direction for German Social History?" by Geoff Eley, 
Jar-uary 1989, 85 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #378. (Now 
in print in Journal of Modern History 51 (June 1989), pp. 2 
97-343. ) 
19 "Notes on the Sociology of Medical Discourse: The Language 
of Case Presentation," by Renee R. ,Anspach, January 1989, 
32 ?ages. Also C3SO Working Paper 8379. 
"World War Two and the Deradicalization of American Labor: 
A 'Deviant Case1 Study," -by Howard Kimeldorf, February 1989, 
45 pages. - Also CRSO Working Paper #383. 
"Taking Stock: The First Year of CSST," by Geoff Eley, 
February 1989, 7 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #384. 
"Immigration Research: A Conceptual Map," by Silvia 
Pedraza-Bailey, February 1989, 15 pages. Also CRSO Working 
Paper 8385. 
"Culture/Power/History. Series Prospectus," by Sherry 
Ortner, Nicholas Dirks, and Geoff Eley, March 1989, 4 pages. 
Also CRSO Working Paper #386. 
"A Feminist Perspective on Christopher Lasch, 'The Social 
Invasion of the Self1," by Sherry Ortner, April 1989, 6 
pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #387. 
"Does Rational Choice Have Utility on the Margins?" by Akos 
Rona-Tas, April 1989, 31 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 
#388. 
Research Fellows Conference Panel on "The Politics of Social 
Tran~formation,~~ by Seong Nae Kim, Joanne Goodwin, Kathleen 
Canning, June 1989. Also CRSO Working Paper #389. 
Research Fellows Conference Panel on "Struggle, Conflict, 
and Constraints on Social Change," by Anne Gorsuch and 
Sharon Reitman, June 1989. Also CRSO Working Paper #390. 
Research Fellows Conference Panel on "Subordinate Actors and 
their Marginalization in Social Theory," by Nilufer Isvan, 
Akos Rona-Tas, Cynthia Buckley, Theresa Deussen, and Mayfair 
Yang, June 1989. Also CRSO Working Paper #391. 
"Toward a Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and 
Tran~formation,'~ by William Sewell, June 1989, 56 pages. 
Also CRSO Working Paper #392. 
"The Power of Individual Subjectivity and the Subjectivity 
of Power in Education," by Peter Appelbaum, July 1989, 40 
pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #396. - .  
"Family Ideology, Class Re:-:yoduction, azd the Suppression of 
Obscenity in Nineteenth Century New York," by Nicola Seisel, 
July 1989, 29 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #39?. 
"Author Meets Critics: Reactions to "Theory and 
Anthropology since the Sixties," Sherry B. Ortner, ed., 
August, 1989. Also CRSO Working Paper #398. 
"Does Social Theory Need History? Reflections on 
Epistemological Encounters in the Social Sciences," by 
Margaret R. Somers, August, 1989, 23 pages. Also CRSO 
Working Paper #399. 
34 "Gender, History and Deconstruction: Joan Wallach Scottls 
Gender And The Politics Of History," by William 9 .  Sewell, 
Jr., August, 1989, 20 pages. Also CRSO Working Papef #400. 
35 "The Social Origins Of Dictatorship, Democracy and 
Socialist Revolution in Central America," by Jeffery M. 
Paige, September 1989, 12 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 
# 4 0 5 .  
36 llMax Weber Meets Feminism: A Reconstruction of Charisma," by 
Cheryl Hyde, September 1989, 24 pages. Also CRSO Working 
Paper #40?. 
3? "Understanding Strikes In Revolutinary Russia," by William 
Resenberg, September 1989, 36 pages. Also CRSO Working 
Paper #408. 
38 "Child Labor Laws: A Historical Case Of Public Policy 
Irnplementati~n,~~ by Marjorie McCall-Sarbaugh and Mayer N. 
Zald, October 1989, 41 pages. Aslo CRSO Working Paper #409. 
39 "Putting German (and Brizlm) Liberalism ioto Context: 
Liberalism, Europe, and the Burgeoisie, 1840-1914," by Geoff 
Eley, November 1989, 39 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 
#411. 
40 "Sringing Unions Back In (Or, Why We Need A Mew Old Labor 
Xistory)," by Howard Kfmeldorf, February 1990, 13 pages. 
Also CRSO Working Paper #414. 

